I think ABC's interpretation of Jiang's IFP idea was pretty much DOA and set to fail. I don't think the game theory was thought out well enough. It was kinda administered in a selfish and short-term mindful manner.
But we do not have to demonize IFP concepts, we can discuss improved concepts.
How about this, as an idea.
1) IFP activation window is a relatively long 1024 blocks with supermajority: ☑️ In last proposal
Subnote: 2/3 seems arbitrary though. Why not more or less? Is there an attack vector with doing just >50%?
2) IFP has some kind of an address whitelist to prevent miners sending coins to themselves. ☑️ In last proposal
3) Instead of a centrally planned whitelist, how about each separate address needs to be voted on by the miners for a rolling 1024 blocks ✖️ Not in last proposal
4) Instead of centrally planned amount to give to the devs, how about miners vote for 1024 blocks and we determine a percentage based on Num of "Less_Fund" blocks - Num of "More_Fund" blocks? ✖️ Not in last proposal
Subnote: each of these voting schemes are separate, so a miner can contribute 600 blocks to ''Lets activate IFP'' but only 50 blocks to ''More_Fund'', for example.
5) Each miner can send their portion of to the block reward to any whitelisted address they want ☑️ In last proposal
We can think of the block reward as a tax if we want to, but why do a 100% tax to give to the miners and 0% to give to the devs? Both are important for the success of the network.
Other agents are also arguably important enough to the health of the network to be funded too, like adoption, advertising, wallet + platform infrastructure, etc...
I think we should be openminded to the idea of fundamental change, as log as we can work together, be peacable, keep our heads, and ensure the long term game theoretics of our proposed systems are stable, productive and scalable.
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source https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/fqvq81/new_ifp_idea/
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